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Abstract. Conventional wisdom has it that truth is always evaluated using our
actual linguistic conventions, even when considering counterfactual scenarios in
which different conventions are adopted. This principle has been invoked in a
number of philosophical arguments, including Kripke’s defense of the necessity
of identity and Lewy’s objection to modal conventionalism. But it is false. It fails
in the presence of what Einheuser (2006) calls c-monsters, or convention-shifting
expressions (on analogy with Kaplan’s monsters, or context-shifting expressions).
We show that c-monsters naturally arise in contexts, such as metalinguistic nego-
tiations, where speakers entertain alternative conventions. We develop an expres-
sivist theory—inspired by Barker (2002) and MacFarlane (2016) on vague predi-
cations and Einheuser (2006) on counterconventionals—to model these shifts in
convention. Using this framework, we reassess the philosophical arguments that
invoked the conventional wisdom.
1 The Conventional Wisdom
There is a famous riddle: If you called a dog’s tail a leg, how many legs
would a dog have? The answer is four, of course! Calling a tail a leg doesn’t
make it one.
This answer reflects a pervasive view about how to evaluate truth at
hypothetical scenarios: truth is always assessed using our actual linguis-
tic conventions, not those of any hypothesized speakers. The following
conditionals illustrate the idea:
(1) If ‘water’ referred to gasoline, water would fuel fire.
(2) If ‘water’ referred to gasoline, ‘water fuels fire’ would be true.
(2) is uncontroversial; we could have spoken differently, and if we had, the
sentence ‘water fuels fire’ would express a true proposition. (1), on the
other hand, seems clearly false; speaking differently would not change the
laws of chemistry.
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The reason for this difference is thatwedescribe counterfactual scenarios
with the languagewe actually speak, not the languagewewouldhave spoken
in that scenario. To invoke a familiar distinction, we are using the term
‘water’ in the consequent of (1), whereas we are mentioning it in that of
(2). As such, ‘water’ in the consequent of (1) refers to what we actually
use ‘water’ to refer to, i.e., the liquidy substance that tends to put out fires,
whereas in the quotational context of (2), it refers to a word, which could
have been interpreted in any number of ways.
This observation is captured by the following general principle:1
Conventional Wisdom. Truth at a scenario (counterfactual or otherwise)
is evaluated relative to our (or the speaker’s) actual linguistic conven-
tions, even if those conventions diverge from the ones adopted in that
scenario.
So when evaluating the truth of a counterfactual of the form A C, we
hold fixed our actual interpretation of A and C and assess whether C, as we
actually interpret it, holds on the counterfactual supposition that A, as we
actually interpret it.
Conventional Wisdom is not a mere matter of pedantry: it has been
wielded in a number of serious philosophical arguments. Kripke (1980)
uses Conventional Wisdom to diffuse an argument against the necessity of
identity. That argument goes like this. Recall that ‘Hesperus’ is a name
for the evening star, i.e., the first celestial body visible after sunset, and
‘Phosphorus’ is a name for the morning star, i.e., the last celestial body
visible before sunrise. As a matter of fact, Venus is both the evening star
and the morning star. Thus, Hesperus is actually identical to Phosphorus.
Imagine aworld, however, whereMars is the first celestial body visible after
sunset, while Venus is still the last celestial body visible before sunrise. It
does not seem true to say that Hesperus is identical to Phosphorus in this
scenario. So, one might think, there is a possible world where Hesperus is
not identical to Phosphorus—thereby showing that identity is contingent.
Not so, Kripke objects: this is only a world where we use language
differently, i.e., where the names ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ are used to
refer to different things. It is not a world where the objects Hesperus and
Phosphorus are distinct—that is, aworldwhere Venus is distinct from itself.
Even if speakers had used the names ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ to refer to different
objects, Hesperus would still be Phosphorus. Kripke defends this by appeal to
Conventional Wisdom:
1This principle is what Wright (1985, p. 190) calls “Convention C”.
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[W]hen we speak of a counterfactual situation, we speak of it in
English, even if it is part of the description of that counterfactual
situation that we were all speaking German in that counterfac-
tual situation. We say, ‘suppose we had all been speaking Ger-
man’ or ‘suppose we had been using English in a nonstandard
way’. Then we are describing a possible world or counterfactual
situation in which people, including ourselves, did speak in a
certain way different from the way we speak. But still, in de-
scribing that world, we use English with our meanings and our
references. (p. 77)
The world so-described is not a world where Hesperus as we use the term
is distinct from Phosphorus as we use the term. So thanks to Conventional
Wisdom, this thought experiment does not refute the necessity of identity.
Here is a second demonstration of the power of Conventional Wisdom.
Certain logical positivists once thought that necessity and contingencywere
grounded in linguistic conventions. This view is known asmodal conven-
tionalism. As Ayer (1952, p. 31) puts it, necessary truths “simply record our
determination to use symbols in a certain fashion.” Modal conventionalism
was attractive in part because it promised to explain how we could come
to know necessary truths without abandoning a broadly empiricist episte-
mology: we come to know whether something is necessary or contingent
simply by leveraging our linguistic competence and reflecting on how we
use words.
But there was a problem. Lewy (1976) argued that modal convention-
alism makes false predictions about the modal connection between our
conventions and necessary truths. While it is contingent what linguistic
conventions we adopt, it is not contingent whether 68 + 57  125—it is not
as thoughwe could havemade 68+57  5 by resolving to use ‘+’ differently.
No matter how we spoke, it would still be true that 68 + 57  125. The modal
conventionalist seems to deny this, attributing to us awesomemathematical
powers. Their mistake is to conflate howwe could use the term ‘+’ with how
we actually use it. They use the hypothetical interpretation of ‘+’ in eval-
uating 68 + 57  125 in the counterfactual scenario—not, as Conventional
Wisdom requires, the actual one.2
Conventional Wisdom has been sharpened into a principle put forth
by Einheuser (2006, pp. 473–475). This principle concerns what she calls
c-monsters, i.e., expressions that shift the conventions used to interpret an-
2See Wright 1985, p. 192 for a response to this objection on behalf of the modal conven-
tionalist.
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other (usually embedded) expression. Einheuser argues that Conventional
Wisdom supports the following conjecture:
No C-Monsters. There are no c-monsters in English.
Inparticular, she claims that counterfactual conditionals inEnglish arenever
interpreted as counterconventionals, i.e., as counterfactuals that shift the
interpretation of expressions in its constituents. This is why, for instance,
(1) seems false; if (1) were interpreted as a counterconventional, it would be
true. Conventional Wisdom rules out counterfactual c-monsters.
The notion of a c-monster is related to, but distinct from, Kaplan’s notion
of a monster. Both monsters and c-monsters involve shifting the content
of an expression. But these shifts are achieved via different mechanisms:
monsters shift the context used to determine content (Kaplan, 1977, p. 499),
whereas c-monsters shift the way context determines content. In Kaplanian
terms, monsters are context-shifting expressions, whereas c-monsters are
character-shifting expressions.
Kaplan famously conjectured that there are no monsters in English.3
But even if there were monsters, that would not imply the existence of
c-monsters. Monsters only affect expressions, such as indexicals or demon-
stratives, whose content depends on the context of use. Expressions that
are not context-sensitive in this sense are not affected by monsters. By con-
trast, c-monsters can affect the content of non-context-sensitive expressions.
Einheuser’s conjecture is primarily concerned with c-monsters of this sort,
capable of shifting the content even of non-context-sensitive expressions
like ‘mountain’, ‘vegetable’, and ‘planet’. Thus, Einheuser’s conjecture is
distinct from Kaplan’s and deserves independent investigation.4
Einheuser defends No C-Monsters and Conventional Wisdom as unsur-
prising features of natural language:
The claim that there are no c-monsters in English, as well as
the claim that [Conventional Wisdom] governs our counterfac-
tual reasoning, is not at all implausible. We judge a situation,
actual or counterfactual, against the conceptual background of
our actual conceptual practices, simply because it is the deeply
entrenched actual conceptual practices (of which we may or
may not be aware) which inform our judgements. There is no
mystery here. (p. 474)
3This claim has undergone intense scrutiny; see for instance Schlenker 2003; Anand and
Nevins 2004; Santorio 2012; Rabern 2012; Yli-Vakkuri 2013; Rabern and Ball 2019; Deal 2019.
4Conversely, the existence of c-monsters does not obviously imply the existence of mon-
sters. Since we are not primarily concerned with monsters, though, we set this aside.
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Einheuser does not deny that one can understand the counterconventional
interpretations of counterfactuals. In fact, she argues that conventionalist
views in metaphysics (views which hold that truths about metaphysical
notions, like existence or modality, are grounded in conventions) ought to
be interpreted as merely making counterconventional claims. But in doing
so, conventionalists are not speaking ordinary English: they are instead
attempting to use language in a novel way.5
We have twomain goals in this paper. The first is to refute Conventional
Wisdom—that is, to show that in many ordinary uses of language, the
conventions used to interpret linguistic expressions are not those of the
speaker or the assessor. We do so by showing that many c-monsters lurk in
the seas of natural language. The second is to develop a systematic theory
that accounts for the presence and behavior of c-monsters by incorporating
conventions into more traditional semantic and pragmatic frameworks. Our
broadly expressivist theory captures how we communicate both about the
conventions we in fact adopt (e.g., in metalinguistic negotiations) and about
possible alternative conventions we might have adopted (with c-monsters).
The plan is as follows. In §2, we present examples of ordinary conver-
sations where Conventional Wisdom is violated. We show that counterfac-
tuals, tenses, attitude verbs, and other expressions can be c-monsters. Our
framework for dealing with this behavior involves both pragmatic and se-
mantic innovations. In §3, we develop a generalized Stalnakerian theory of
communication that takes the common ground in a conversation to bemod-
eled as a set ofworld-convention pairs. On this view, assertions don’t simply
communicate factual matters, but also serve to express speakers’ commit-
ments to use language in a certain way. In §4, we develop a semantics for
c-monsters, which explains their ability to shift the interpretation of terms,
and thus communicate about alternative convention choices, through the
introduction of a convention parameter in the index of evaluation. In §5,
we return to the philosophical arguments mentioned above that invoked
Conventional Wisdom, and reevaluate them in light of its failure. In §6,
we conclude with some reflections about what our account means for the
nature of language and linguistic competence.
5Einheuser’s settled view onNoC-Monsters is somewhat unclear. In the quoted passage,
she seems to be defending No C-Monsters in full, but then in the next paragraph (p. 475),
she hedges, saying that we are “ordinarily not aware of the availability of the countercon-
ventional reading” and that counterconventionals are “prima facie less natural” than the
ordinary reading of counterfactuals, suggesting that she might be willing to concede that




In this section, we argue against Conventional Wisdom by presenting per-
fectly natural conversations containing c-monsters (§§2.1–2.2). We also ad-
dress some potential objections (§§2.3–2.5).
2.1 Bring Pluto Back!
In 2006, the International Astronomical Union (IAU) convened to reconsider
the scientific definition of a planet. While Pluto was officially classified as
a planet at the time, astronomers were aware of objects in the solar system
that had an equally good claim to planethood, including Ceres (a large
celestial object in the asteroid belt) and some trans-Neptunian objects (Eris,
Haumea, and Makemake). Thus, according to the original definition of the
term, the solar system contained more planets than the nine that had been
officially recognized. And there was no reason to suspect the list would not
continue to grow even more with future astronomical discoveries.
Ultimately, the IAU decided to revise the definition of ‘planet’ so as to
require all planets to “clear their orbital neighborhood”, meaning they had
to be substantially more massive than anything else in the general vicinity
of their orbit. Since Pluto’s orbit crosses Neptune’s, and Neptune is 10,000
times more massive than Pluto, Pluto failed to meet this condition and so
was classified as a dwarf planet rather than as a planet. Other objects (Ceres,
Eris, etc.) were classified as dwarf planets for similar reasons.
The public outcry was immense. People took to the streets after the IAU
announced that Pluto had been downgraded. Theymade T-shirts proclaim-
ing, “Bring Pluto back!” and “Pluto is still a planet in my heart”.6 State
legislatures in Illinois and California reacted critically, while NewMexico’s
went as far as declaring Pluto to be a planet whenever it “passes overhead
through NewMexico’s excellent night skies”.7 Even amongst astronomers,
the decision was controversial. Some scientists argued that expressions
such as ‘general vicinity’ and ‘significantly moremassive’ rendered the def-
inition too vague for scientific purposes. Other scientists, albeit a minority,
thought the new definition was fine but argued it would have been more
convenient for Pluto to have been grandfathered in as a planet.8
Consider now the following (not so) hypothetical dialogue:
6Still available for purchase online as of this writing.
7See State of Illinois 2009; DeVore 2006; State of New Mexico 2007.
8For an engaging account of the controversy, see Brown 2010.
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(3) Alpha: Pluto is a planet.
Beta: No it’s not. Pluto is not a planet because it does not clear its
orbital neighborhood.
Alpha: I don’t accept the IAU’s definition! Pluto is a planet, I don’t
care what the IAU says.
Beta: Look, I know that you think that Pluto is a planet, but there’s
a good reason the IAU disagrees. If Pluto were a planet,
there would be dozens of planets in the solar system.
Focus on Beta’s last response, which takes the form of a counterfactual:
(4) If Pluto were a planet, there would be dozens of planets in the solar
system.
In the given context, (4) is most naturally interpreted as a claim not about
what would happen if Pluto cleared its orbital neighborhood but about
what would happen if Pluto were classified differently. That is, one hears
(4) more along the lines of (5-a) than (5-b):
(5) a. If Pluto were classified as a planet, dozens of other objects in the
solar system would be too.
b. If Pluto cleared its orbital neighborhood, dozens of other objects
in the solar system would too.
Moreover, what Beta is saying with (4) seems right. The reason for revising
the definition was precisely to avoid the proliferation of objects with equal
claim to planethood as Pluto. So if Pluto counted as a planet, so would
Ceres, Eris, and so on.
For Beta’s assertion to be interpreted in this way, theword ‘planet’ has to
be interpreted differently from how Beta interprets it. After all, Beta agrees
with the IAU on how to use the term ‘planet’. And according to the IAU,
planets by definition must clear their orbital neighborhood. Hence, if we
interpreted ‘planet’ using the linguistic conventions Beta adopts, (4) would
have the force of (5-b)—itwould suggest that a change in Pluto’s orbitwould
result in significant changes to the orbits of Ceres, Eris, and so on. Not only
is that probably false, but it is also uncharitable as an interpretation of what
Beta is saying. In order to obtain the correct interpretation of (4), ‘planet’
must be interpreted relative to conventions other than Beta’s own.
Indeed, even if we, the assessors, agree with the IAU about how to use
the word ‘planet’, we can still interpret Beta’s use of (4) in the way it was
intended, i.e., as a claim about Pluto’s possible classification rather than
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about Pluto’s possible orbit. So we still have to reinterpret ‘planet’ in the
consequent of (4) to obtain the correct interpretation of the counterfactual.9
Thus, (4) violates Conventional Wisdom.
Beta’s final assertion contains another violation of Conventional Wis-
dom. Beta ascribes to Alpha a belief that Pluto is a planet:
(6) Alpha thinks that Pluto is a planet.
According to Conventional Wisdom, ‘planet’ in (6) must be interpreted
according to the IAU’s definition, not Alpha’s conventions, in which case
(6) would imply that Alpha thinks Pluto clears its orbital neighborhood.
But it is common ground here that Alpha knows that Pluto does not clear
its orbital neighborhood. Thus, (6) would be false if Conventional Wisdom
were true: it would incorrectly ascribe to Alpha a false empirical belief
about Pluto’s orbit, rather than a controversial but sensible view about how
to define ‘planet’.
We think that (4) and (6) have true readings and thus violate Conven-
tional Wisdom.10 Moreover, (4) and (6) seem to contain c-monsters. In
(4), it is the counterfactual context that induces a shift in the conventions
used to interpret ‘planet’. Without the embedded context, ‘planet’ must be
interpreted using the conventions the speaker actually adopts. For consider
Alpha’s earlier claim:
(7) Pluto is a planet.
Alpha can felicitously assert this because Pluto counts as a planet on their
preferred classification. ButBeta,whoadopts the IAU’sdefinition excluding
9As we use the terms here, to change how one classifies things as planets is to change
the conventional interpretation of ‘planet’. We are not committed to the converse, however.
We could change the conventions associated with ‘planet’ so that it refers to vegetables,
for instance, without in any interesting sense changing how we classify things as planets
(e.g., we would not be revising the IAU’s classification but simply co-opting the word for
other ends). Indeed, talk of “classifying” in natural language is quite complex and could
use more investigation. We thank an anonymous reviewer for pressing us to think more
carefully about the relationship between classification and conventions.
10We do not deny that they also have false readings. Depending on the context, (4) can be
interpreted factually, i.e., holding fixed what Beta means by ‘planet’. On this interpretation,
(4) sounds more like (5-b), which is clearly false. Similarly, there are contexts in which (6)
would be heard as false. One might use (6) precisely to attribute to Alpha the mistaken
belief that Pluto fits the IAU’s criteria for planethood. (In this case, it would be natural to
describe ‘planet’ as being read de re.) We only hold that (4) and (6) are not always used in
these ways. It is their true readings, incompatible with Conventional Wisdom, that we aim
to account for.
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Pluto from planethood, cannot felicitously assert the same sentence (unless,
of course, theydecide to adopt different conventions for the purposes of con-
versation). It is only inside the scope of an embedding expression, such as
a counterfactual, that ‘planet’ gets (re)interpreted according to conventions
that Beta does not adopt. This strongly suggests that it is the counterfac-
tual environment that triggers the shift in the conventional interpretation
of ‘planet’—that is, that (4) contains a c-monster.
2.2 Other C-Monsters
Violations of Conventional Wisdom are not isolated to counterfactuals and
belief reports. C-monsters occur in plenty of other embedding environ-
ments, including tense, circumstantial modality, and other attitude verbs.
First, tense. Suppose it is common knowledge that Pluto’s orbit has not
changed and Pluto has never cleared its orbital neighborhood. Even so, it
would be appropriate for Beta to say:
(8) a. Pluto used to be a planet, but it isn’t any more.
b. Pluto will no longer be a planet once the IAU’s decision goes
into effect.
(8-a) conveys that Pluto’s classification has changed over time: in the past,
Pluto was classified as a planet, but no more. Similarly, (8-b) conveys that
Pluto’s classification, not its orbit, will change. If we held fixed what Beta
currently means by ‘planet’, these interpretations would be unavailable. So
just like (4), the examples in (8) violate Conventional Wisdom.
Circumstantial (i.e., “metaphysical”)modals alsogive rise to c-monstrous
interpretations. Suppose it was the vote of a single stubborn scientist that
determined how Pluto would be classified. Beta can then say:
(9) a. Pluto could have easily been a planet. But that one stubborn
scientist voted for the current definition, so it is not.
b. That one stubborn scientist can still make Pluto a planet again.
They just need to rescind their vote.
Other metaphysically loaded words, such as ‘depends’, ‘explains’, and ‘be-
cause’, give rise to similar effects:11
(10) a. Whether or not Pluto is a planet depends on what definition the
members of the IAU agree on.
11Thanks to Zoltán Szabó for pointing this out.
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b. Part of what explains why Pluto is not a planet is the IAU’s
decision in 2006 to redefine ‘planet’.
c. Because of the IAU’s decision in 2006, Pluto is not a planet.
Each of the sentences in (9) and (10) seems true on its intended interpreta-
tion. For (9-a) says that Pluto could have easily been classified as a planet,
(9-b) that Pluto can still be classified as a planet, (10-a) that how Pluto is
classified depends on the IAU’s decision, and so on. But again, if we held
fixed what Beta means by ‘planet’, none of these sentences would receive
plausible readings.
Not all metaphysically loaded words can be c-monsters. A possible
exception is ‘cause’. It is hard to hear the following as true:
(11) ??The IAU caused Pluto to be a dwarf planet.
Why is ‘cause’ different from the expressions in (10)? We are not entirely
sure; certainly changes in classification can cause other things. But we need
not belabor this question. Our main aim here is just to show that a wide
variety of expressions can act as c-monsters, not that all do.
Returning to attitude verbs, ‘thinks’ is not alone in its potential to behave
c-monstrously. Recall (6):
(6) Alpha thinks that Pluto is a planet.
The following can also be asserted felicitously, even by someonewho adopts
the IAU’s definition:
(12) a. Betawishes Plutowere a planet (but they couldn’t care less about
whether it clears its orbital neighborhood).
b. Gamma fears Pluto is a planet (though Gamma is hardly both-
ered by the possibility that it clears its orbital neighborhood).
In each case, the content of the attitude ascribed concerns whether Pluto
counts as a planet, not Pluto’s orbit. (6) says that Alpha counts Pluto as a
planet, (12-a) says Beta wishes Pluto counted as a planet, and (12-b) says
Gamma fears Pluto counts as a planet. To obtain these readings, we cannot
interpret ‘planet’ according to the IAU’s definition. (12-a) does not say, for
instance, that Alpha wishes Pluto were a planet as the IAU defines the term.
So each of these sentences violates Conventional Wisdom.
The attitude verb ‘consider’ is an interesting case with respect to c-
monsters, since it can be used to express opinions about matters of conven-
10
tion but not purely factual beliefs. Thus, Beta can say:
(13) Alpha considers Pluto a planet (though they know Pluto does not
clear its orbital neighborhood).
Again, we clearly will not have a plausible reading of this report if we
hold fixed what we (or others who agree with the IAU) mean by ‘planet’.
Alpha does not consider Pluto a planet in the IAU’s sense. They are instead
advocating for a different understanding of ‘planet’. So again, we have an
example of a c-monster, thus violating Conventional Wisdom.
As Kennedy andWiller (2016, p. 915) have pointed out, ‘consider’ seems
to require a certain classificatory contingency that other attitude verbs (such
as ‘think’) do not. Witness the following contrast:
(14) a. #Alpha considers Earth a planet.
b. Alpha considers Pluto a planet.
Intuitively, (14-a) is marked because on every plausible way of classifying
things, Earth will count as a planet. By contrast, (14-b) is fine because
different plausible ways of classifying things differ in their verdicts about
whether Pluto is a planet. (14-b) can be used to convey that Alpha endorses
a way of understanding ‘planet’ on which Pluto counts, but this is only
felicitous because there are other salient classifications on which it would
not count. With ‘think’, however, both are felicitous:
(15) a. Alpha thinks Earth is a planet.
b. Alpha thinks Pluto is a planet.
Unlike ‘consider’, there is no requirement on ‘think’ that other salient clas-
sifications be available. So while (15-a) can be used merely to express a
mundane factual belief, (14-a) must do more. (We will return to this obser-
vation in §3.)
Not all attitude verbs can be c-monsters. Factive attitude verbs, for
instance, cannot be. In the context of (3), Beta cannot truly assert:
(16) #Alpha knows that Pluto is a planet.
This makes sense given that ‘knows’ is factive: if one accepts (16), one must
accept that Pluto is a planet. So if one adopts an interpretation of ‘planet’
according to which Pluto does not count as a planet, then (16) should sound
false.
There are also expressions that specify the conventions one is to use to
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evaluate another expression. Suppose Alpha specifically endorses the old
definition of ‘planet’, but does not realize that Ceres meets that definition.
One can still say:
(17) a. Ceres is a planet in Alpha’s sense (though they do not realize it).
b. Ceres is a planet as Alpha defines it (though they do not realize
it).
These qualificationphrases ‘inAlpha’s sense’ or ‘asAlphadefines it’ directly
shift the interpretation of ‘planet’ to the conventions Alpha adopts, even if
the speaker does not adopt those conventions.
We thus find that a wide variety of expressions can be c-monsters,
thereby violating Conventional Wisdom.12 In the next sections, we develop
a broad framework that accommodates these readings by including conven-
tions in the linguistic theory. The semantic machinery needed to interpret
c-monstrous constructions will come in §4. Our account there will build
on a pragmatic framework incorporating conventions, which we develop in
§3. Before turning to that, however, we wish to forestall three potential re-
sponses to the datawe have presented. (Readerswho are already convinced
may skip ahead to §3.)
2.3 Gricean Explanation
One could try to maintain Conventional Wisdomwhile explaining the con-
versation in (3) along the following lines. In the relevant context, it is
common ground that (4) and (6) express literal falsehoods (or trivialities).
Pragmatic repair along familiar Gricean lines then kicks into gear (Grice,
1975). Knowing that Beta did not intend to communicate something absurd
or trivial, we understand them as trying to communicate something explic-
itly metalinguistic (modeled after (2)). For example, we might understand
Beta’s utterance of (4) as a non-standard attempt to say:
(18) If ‘planet’ were defined so as to include Pluto, then dozens of objects
in the solar system would be called ‘planets’.
The defender of this line owes us a theory of how these utterances are
transformed into explicitlymetalinguistic ones. We think that the prospects
12We do not claim our list here to be exhaustive. We suspect some of the following
expressions can also be c-monsters, but we are not all in agreement about which: the
attitude verbs ‘doubt’ and ‘wish’; agentive ‘can’; deontic modals, like ‘ought’; and epistemic
modals, like ‘might’ and ‘probably’. We leave investigation of these to future work.
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for such a theory are not goodbecause the exact nature of the transformation
into an explicitly metalinguistic sentence is highly unsystematic.
Take, for example, the belief report from (6). This would not be a good
gloss on that sentence:
(19) Alpha thinks that ‘planet’ is defined so as to include Pluto.
For Alpha knows that this is not how the IAU defines it. A better gloss
would be:
(20) Alpha thinks that ‘planet’ should be defined so as to include Pluto.
But we cannot similarly paraphrase (21-a) with (21-b):
(21) a. If Pluto were a planet, Alpha would be happy.
b. If ‘planet’ should have been defined so as to include Pluto, Alpha
would be happy.
Alternatively, we could try to paraphrase (6) with:
(22) Alpha classifies Pluto as a ‘planet’.
But this leaves us unable to paraphrase more complex sentences. For in-
stance, suppose Alpha is unsure how to define ‘planet’, but thinks that it
should be defined so as to include Pluto if Pluto is at least 1026 kg. Then it
sounds fine to say:
(23) Alpha thinks that either Pluto is a planet or Pluto is less than 1026 kg.
But we cannot simply paraphrase this as:
(24) #Alpha classifies Pluto as either a ‘planet’ or ‘less than 1026 kg’.
While we could keep exploring further epicycles of revisions to this strat-
egy,13 we think thedifficulties heremotivatepursuingadifferent approach—
one that takes the data at face value.
13One possibility is to assimilate apparent c-monsters to the phenomenon of mixed quo-
tation, or perhaps scare quotes. See, e.g., Shan 2010 andMaier 2014. Then again, we suspect
our analysis of c-monsters might help in the analysis of these linguistic devices, though
we leave this for future investigation. Thanks to Chris Barker, Dan López de Sa, and John
MacFarlane for suggesting this.
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2.4 Sameness of Meaning
One might think that Alpha and Beta actually agree on the meaning of
‘planet’ in (3) in that both are referring to the property of planethood,
and instead just disagree over what makes something a planet, i.e., what
planethood is.14 (As an analogy, a utilitarian and a Kantian can disagree
over what is right or wrong without meaning different things by the words
‘right’ and ‘wrong’.) In this case, ‘thinks’ would not need to shift the
interpretation of ‘planet’ in order for (6) to come out true.
While we find much to agree with here, we maintain this strategy will
not save Conventional Wisdom, for two reasons. First, it already departs
from Conventional Wisdom in an important way. Second, we do not think
that, in disagreeing over what makes something a planet, Alpha and Beta
are guaranteed to mean the same thing by ‘planet’—it depends on what we
mean by “meaning”.
First: On the conventional view, the interpretation of ‘planet’ is an inten-
sion, i.e., a function from worlds to extensions. According to Conventional
Wisdom, then, the intension associated with ‘planet’ in (6) is the intension
the speaker (or perhaps the assessor) actually associates with it. Thus, the
sentence ‘Pluto is a planet’, when Beta uses it (even in (6)), picks out the set
of worlds where Pluto has the property that Beta actually associates with
‘planet’, viz., the set of worlds where Pluto has the right size and shape and
also clears its orbital neighborhood.
ButwhenAlpha and Beta disagree overwhatmakes something a planet,
they disagree over what intension to associate with ‘planet’, i.e., the rule for
determining which objects at which worlds fall in the extension of ‘planet’.
They do not, therefore, pick out the same set of worlds with ‘Pluto is a
planet’: when Alpha uses that sentence, it picks out a set that includes
worlds where Pluto does not clear its orbital neighborhood. So if we want
to maintain that Alpha and Beta “mean the same thing” by their use of
‘planet’—ifwewant to preserve ConventionalWisdomorNoC-Monsters in
face of such examples—then wemust adopt a notion of “meaning” or “con-
ventional interpretation” that is not just a simple intension. This already
strays from the original spirit of ConventionalWisdom andNoC-Monsters.
This leads us to our second point: In what sense do Alpha and Beta
“mean the same thing” by their use of ‘planet’ if they do not associate
the same intension with it? We will provide one answer in §3 (see also
footnote 29), but we do not claim that our answer is the only reasonable one.
There are many things one could mean by “meaning”, and it is best to just
14We thank an anonymous reviewer for pressing us to discuss this issue.
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be clear about what notion one has in mind. The question is whether there
is a notion ofmeaning that saves ConventionalWisdomwithout trivializing
it. Everyone agrees that, in a trivial disquotational sense, both Alpha and
Beta refer to planethood with ‘planet’, but this is compatible with different
views about whether that’s sufficient for Alpha and Beta to truly mean the
same thing.
For example, one could understand the “meaning” of ‘planet’ in terms
of the role it plays in our linguistic community. Alpha and Beta might, for
instance, agree that the conventions governing ‘planet’ should conform to
the IAU’s definition, whatever that is, but Alpha mistakenly believes that
this definition does not include the orbital neighborhood condition. Alpha
and Beta then associate different intensions with ‘planet’, while nonetheless
agreeing to define ‘planet’ as the IAU does.
We are happy to describe this as a case where speakers agree on what
‘planet’ means (in a sense), but not on what makes something a planet.
Crucially, however, we do not think that all cases where speakers disagree
over intension are cases where speakers agree on meaning in this sense. In
the original set-up for (3), for instance, Alpha and Beta do not even agree on
whether to follow the IAU’s definition of ‘planet’. Even if Alpha and Beta
fully agree about which intensions play which roles, they may nevertheless
disagree over what role to assign the term ‘planet’ in the first place. Thus,
while disagreement over intension can result from a factual disagreement
over what intension fills a certain role, it need not do so.15
2.5 Externalism
Perhaps, however, the intension associated with ‘planet’ is determined by
external factors that are the same for both Alpha and Beta. For exam-
ple, some externalists (following Putnam (1973)) hold that the meaning of
‘planet’ depends on causal ormetaphysical factors. Others (followingBurge
(1979)) hold that the meaning of ‘planet’ depends on the wider linguistic
community. In either case, Alpha and Beta would use ‘planet’ with the
same intension, perhaps without realizing it. If so, then Alpha and Beta
would pick out the same set of worlds with ‘Pluto is a planet’ after all.
15Similarly, a utilitarian and Kantian may agree on the role that the term ‘right’ is to play
while disagreeing about what intension fills that role. Then, they could be said to agree
about the meaning of ‘right’, but not about what makes something right. Alternatively, they
may have a more fundamental disagreement over what role the term is to play. Then, they
would not even agree on the meaning of ‘right’ in the sense under consideration. We do not
take a stand here on what kind of dispute ethicists tend to be engaged in.
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Externalism does not on its own save Conventional Wisdom. Even
if ‘planet’ has a meaning that depends on external factors, that doesn’t
explain its embedded behavior. Whatever interpretation is associated with
‘planet’, bywhatever combination ofmetaphysical and social facts one likes,
Conventional Wisdom stipulates that this interpretation be held fixed in all
embedded contexts. So, according to Conventional Wisdom, if external
factors determine that ‘planet’ is interpreted so that planets must clear their
orbital neighborhood, it will retain this interpretation in counterfactuals
such as (4). Thus, either the externally determined interpretation of ‘planet’
is shifted in (4), in which case Conventional Wisdom fails, or it is not, in
which case we cannot explain the available true reading of (4).
Still, an externalist might take issue with our characterization of the
dispute between Alpha and Beta. A Putnam-style externalist, for instance,
might argue that the interpretation of ‘planet’ is a natural kind, so that
the IAU did not change the definition of ‘planet’ but rather discovered
something about planets. We do not incline towards this kind of view in
the case of ‘planet’. But this does not affect our main line of argument.
This version of externalism is implausible for conventional kinds such as
martinis, SUVs, or smartphones. So there remainsmotivation for our overall
picture even if one is skeptical of the ‘planet’ example. For ease of exposition,
we will assume that this kind of externalism is false for ‘planet’, though one
should feel free to replace this example with another if desired.
Alternatively, a social externalist might argue that a single individual
cannot change the interpretation of ‘planet’ by themselves. However, our
view is not incompatible with this claim. We do not require that Alpha can
change the conventions associated with ‘planet’ in their community just
by asserting ‘Pluto is a planet’. Their assertion would have to be accepted
by some relevant portion of their linguistic community for that to happen.
Instead, we may view their assertion as a (possibly unsuccessful) attempt to
get their linguistic community to change its linguistic conventions.16 Thus,
our view is compatible with social externalism like that of Burge (1979),
according to which the wider linguistic community, and not just individual
speakers, determines the meanings of words.
3 Conventions as Plans for How to Talk
In the previous section, we presented examples where c-monsters naturally
emerge and Conventional Wisdom is violated. We now develop a picture
16On meaning change and externalism, see, e.g., Lassiter 2008; Koch 2018.
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of communication that will provide the foundation for our semantics of
c-monsters, in §4.
3.1 Metalinguistic Negotiations
Let us focus for now just on the beginning of the exchange between Alpha
and Beta from (3)—before Beta asserts the c-monstrous counterfactual:
(25) Alpha: Pluto is a planet.
Beta: No it’s not. Pluto is not a planet because it does not clear its
orbital neighborhood.
Alpha: I don’t accept the IAU’s definition! Pluto is a planet, I don’t
care what the IAU says.
In the literature, exchanges like (25) have been calledmetalinguistic nego-
tiations.17 A metalinguistic negotiation is a dispute over how to use terms
(here, ‘planet’), rather than about factual matters. These disputes concern
what counts as what rather than what things are like. So with (7), Alpha does
not intend to communicate anything factual about Pluto:
(7) Pluto is a planet.
It is common ground between Alpha and Beta that Pluto is significantly
smaller than Neptune, fails to clear its orbital neighborhood, and so on.
Rather, Alpha is advocating for a certainway of classifying things as planets,
on which Pluto would count.
This distinction between twoways onemight use a predicate like ‘planet’
is analogous to a distinction made by Barker (2002) between two ways of
using gradable predicates like ‘tall’. Consider the following sentence:
(26) Feynman is tall.
One can use (26) to convey something about Feynman’s height. For in-
stance, someone who has never seen Feynman could learn that his height
is relatively great. Call this the descriptive use of (26). But one can also
use (26) differently: to convey something not about Feynman’s height but
17See Plunkett and Sundell 2013, p. 15 and Plunkett 2015, p. 832. The term was partly
inspired by thework ofKyburg andMorreau (2000) andBarker (2002) on vague predications.
Metalinguistic negotiations are also what Haslanger (2000, p. 33) calls “analytical projects”;
later, Haslanger (2005, p. 11) calls them “ameliorative projects”. Related work goes back at
least to Gallie 1955. See also McConnell-Ginet 2006, 2008; Burgess and Plunkett 2013a,b;
Ludlow 2014; Cappelen 2018; Sterken 2019; Hansen 2019.
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instead about what counts as tall in that context. For instance, someone who
has seen Feynman could learn that his height counts as tall in this country.
Call this the classificatory use of (26).
One distinguishing feature of classificatory uses of gradable adjectives
is the way they interact with phrases such as ‘counts as’, ‘consider’, and
‘to me’. In general, classificatory uses of sentences containing gradable
adjectives can be reported using phrases of the form ‘I count x as F’ or ‘I
consider x [to be] F’ or ‘x is F to me’. The same is not true for descriptive
uses, however.
For instance, unless there is some unclarity over how tomeasure height,
the extension of ‘taller than’ will not depend on what counts as tall in an
ordinary context. Thus, ‘taller than’ generally has only a descriptive use.
Suppose we know exactly how tall Feynman and Fermi are. In that case,
each of the following is marked:
(27) a. #I count Feynman as taller than Fermi.
b. #I consider Feynman [to be] taller than Fermi.
c. #To me, Feynman is taller than Fermi.
Each of these seems to suggest, incorrectly, that one can simply decide that
Feynman is taller than Fermi.
By contrast, if someone asks, ‘What is tall in your country?’, each of the
following is felicitous:
(28) a. I count Feynman as tall.
b. I consider Feynman [to be] tall.
c. To me, Feynman is tall.
But they will sound marked again in contexts where the standards for ‘tall’
are clear. Thus, we can use phrases like ‘count as’, ‘consider’, and ‘to me’
as tests for when a sentence is being used in a classificatory or descriptive
way.18
The descriptive use of (26) is easy to accommodate on a traditional
18Note there is an important difference between ‘I count x as F’, which only conveys a
classificatory use, and ‘x counts as F’, which can be used descriptively. Suppose there is a
sign for a roller coaster ride that says how tall one must be to ride. In that case, ‘I count
Feynman as tall enough’ still seems to suggest the matter can be settled by stipulation.
By contrast, it would be perfectly fine to say ‘Feynman counts as tall enough’ to convey
something about Feynman’s height. Thus, ‘x counts as F’ can be used to convey either the
descriptive or classificatory use (though perhaps the latter is more common). Similarly for
the difference between ‘I consider x [to be] F’ and ‘x is considered [to be] F’.
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Stalnakerian theory of assertion,19 on which both assertoric content and
common ground are modeled as sets of worlds—so long as we assume
that each context comes equipped with a threshold for gradable adjectives
like ‘tall’. When a speaker asserts (26) in a context, they are proposing to
remove from the common ground worlds in which Feynman is not above
the contextually-determined threshold.
The classificatory use is harder to accommodate, however. The problem
is that when a speaker uses (26) classificatorily, they are conveying some-
thing about the threshold, not just Feynman’s height. But if it is commonly
accepted in the conversation that Feynman is 6’1”, then an assertion of (26)
does nothing to the common ground. So such a classificatory use of (26) is
predicted to be semantically uninformative on Stalnaker’s theory.
To account for classificatory uses of vague predications, Barker (2002)
proposes to model the common ground of a conversation as a set of world-
delineation pairs, where the delineation specifies the threshold for vague
predicates such as ‘tall’. If it is common knowledge what counts as tall in a
given context, then the delineation parameter will be the same in every pair
in this set. But if not, then different pairsmay contain different delineations.
An assertion of (26) rules out every world-delineation pair 〈w , d〉 where
Feynman at w falls below the threshold picked out by d.
We propose to extend this model of vague predication to predication
more broadly.20 Indeed, just as there are two uses of (26), there are also two
uses of (7):
(7) Pluto is a planet.
First, one can use (7) to convey something about Pluto’s physical charac-
teristics, such as its orbit. As with vague predications, we might call this
the descriptive use of (7). Second, one can use (7) to convey something
about what counts as a planet. We saw such a use in the metalinguistic
negotiation in (25). Again, as with vague predications, we might call this
the classificatory use of (7).
Building on the observation fromKennedy andWiller (2016) thatwe saw
above, the same tests for distinguishingdescriptive and classificatoryuses of
gradable adjectives can be used to distinguish descriptive and classificatory
uses of other predicates. For instance, it generally sounds bad to say:
(29) a. #I count Earth as a planet.
19See Stalnaker 1970, 1978, 1999, 2002.
20Barker (2013, p. 252) and MacFarlane (2018, §11) consider, but do not pursue this possi-
bility.
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b. #I consider Earth [to be] a planet.
c. #To me, Earth is a planet.
By contrast, it sounds fine to say:21
(30) a. I count Pluto as a planet.
b. I consider Pluto [to be] a planet.
c. To me, Pluto is a planet.
The analogy with vague predications suggests that classificatory uses
of (7) can be modeled similarly to how Barker models classificatory uses
of (26). Instead of talking about delineations for vague predicates, we talk
more generally about conventions for interpreting all predicates. Whereas a
delineation determines the threshold for gradable adjectives, a convention
determines the intension assigned to predicates. On this model, we take
the common ground of a conversation not to be a set of worlds, nor a set
of world-delineation pairs, but a set of world-convention pairs. An assertion
of (7) rules out every world-convention pair 〈w , c〉 where Pluto is not a
planet at w as interpreted according to c, i.e., where Pluto at w is not in the
extension assigned to ‘planet’ by c at w.22
3.2 What is a Convention?
We think of a linguistic convention as a type of plan: a plan for how to use
words.23 In any given conversational context, each speaker adopts certain
21The conditions for classificatory uses are related to the conditions that Kennedy and
Willer identify for licensing ‘consider’ attitude reports, but they do not perfectly line up.
Kennedy andWiller hold that ‘consider’ is felicitous when the embedded claim is “counter-
stance contingent”, meaning that its truth varies across different salient choices for how to
define terms. Any use of a sentence that is classificatory in our sense will be counterstance
contingent, assuming, as seems reasonable, that the conventions left open in the common
ground are all salient. However, the reverse does not hold. A sentencemay be counterstance
contingent even though all conversational participants are in agreement in their rejection
of the, nonetheless salient, linguistic choice that would make it true. For instance, an as-
tronomer talking only with like-minded colleagues, all known to be in support of the IAU’s
new definition, can still felicitously say that lots of people consider Pluto a planet. But they
cannot use (7) classificatorily, to rule out conventions left open in the common ground.
22This is not to say that conventions can simply replace delineations in an adequate model
of vague predication. Delineations may require different structure than conventions to
accommodate the ways in which gradable adjectives can be modified by measure phrases
(as in ‘2 feet tall’). We set this aside here.
23One might of course, following Lewis (1969), hold that a convention literally just is
a special kind of plan, i.e., a plan to act in certain ways in special kinds of coordination
problems. We do not need to go that far, however. Our use of the word ‘convention’ should
20
conventions for how to use language. Most of the time, speakers endorse a
common set of conventions, but not always. They may disagree about edge
cases for ‘planet’, for example. Speakers might also be undecided about
which conventions to adopt—their plans for how to talk may be (and often
are) incomplete. Thus, there may be multiple conventions for how to use
a word like ‘planet’ in a given conversation left open by what the speakers
commonly accept. In that case, an assertion of a sentence like (7) will rule
out from the common ground not only certain ways the world could be but
also certain ways of speaking. If a speaker’s assertion is accepted by the
other conversational participants, then theywill come to adopt the speaker’s
proposal for how to talk. In effect, accepting (7) will be partly a matter of
deciding how to use ‘planet’.
Talk of conventions as plans is meant to invoke a comparison with the
expressivist theory of normative discourse developed by Gibbard (2003).
For Gibbard, an agent’s mental state is characterized not just by what they
believe the world is like, but also by their intentions, i.e., what plans they
adopt. A plan can be thought of as a set of what Gibbard calls hyperplans,
i.e., maximally specific plans for how to act in any situation. According to
Gibbard, when a speaker asserts a sentence with purely normative content,
such as ‘Sherlock ought to pack’, they express a planning state—that is,
they express something about what actions their adopted plan permits in
Sherlock’s situation. We canmodel this in a broadly Stalnakerian framework
by taking the content of a sentence, as well as the common ground of
a conversation, to be modeled not as a set of worlds, but a set of world-
hyperplan pairs. Accepting an assertion of ‘Sherlock ought to pack’ rules
out of the common ground world-hyperplan pairs 〈w , h〉 where h permits
Sherlock not to pack at w.
It is also analogous to the expressivist theory of vagueness developed
by MacFarlane (2016). MacFarlane starts with a Barker-style semantics for
vague terms, but proposes a Gibbardian interpretation of it, onwhich delin-
eations are thought of as hyperplans for resolving vagueness. Thus, when
a speaker asserts, say, ‘Apple A is large’, they express a planning state that
commits them to counting apple A as large. Accepting such an assertion
rules out of the commongroundworld-delineationpairs 〈w , d〉where apple
A does not meet the threshold for ‘large’ set by d at w.
In the same way, we propose that a speaker’s mental state is character-
ized not just by their factual commitments, i.e., by what possibilities they
accept, but also by their conventional commitments, i.e., by what conven-
not be taken to provide an analysis of the concept as opposed to a technical stipulation.
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tions they adopt. A convention can be modeled as a set of what we’ll call
hyperconventions, i.e., maximally specific interpretations of every single
word in the language. Formally, a hyperconvention can be represented as
an interpretation function in the usual model-theoretic sense, i.e., a func-
tion that assigns an ordinary possible-worlds intension to every non-logical
expression (see §4 for details).
So a speaker’s conventional commitments can be represented by a set
of world-hyperconvention pairs—intuitively, those pairs that are not ruled
out by what the speaker thinks the world is like and what conventions they
adopt. We represent a speaker’s mental state as a set of pairs of worlds
and hyperconventions, rather than a pair of sets of worlds and of hypercon-
ventions, in order to capture the way in which a speaker’s conventional
commitments may be contingent on what the world is like. For instance, a
speakermay be ignorant of the definition of ‘planet’ the IAU adopts but nev-
ertheless adopt a plan to use the word however the IAU uses it. In that case,
the speaker rules out certain combinations of worlds and hyperconventions
even though each individual world or hyperconvention is live.
These conventional commitments are very much like commitments to
adopt certain plans in Gibbard’s sense. Indeed, many of the key ideas
Gibbard uses to develop an expressivist theory of normative discourse, and
that MacFarlane applies in his expressivist theory of vagueness, can be
used to develop a parallel theory of metalinguistic negotiations in a broadly
Stalnakerian spirit.
3.3 Communication
Given this picture of a speaker’s mental state, we can revise Stalnaker’s the-
ory of assertion by simply replacing worlds with world-hyperconvention
pairs at every level. The common ground, i.e., what is commonly accepted
by the conversational participants both in terms of their factual commit-
ments and their conventional commitments, can be modeled formally as
a set of pairs of possible worlds and hyperconventions. Assertion is then
just a kind of proposal to remove world-hyperconvention pairs from the
common ground.
Thus, an assertion of a simple sentence such as (7) will not just be a
proposal to rule out certain worlds from the common ground, but also
certain ways of speaking. The assertoric content of (7) is the set of world-
hyperconvention pairs 〈w , c〉 according to which Pluto at w is in the exten-
sion assigned to ‘planet’ by c at w. Accepting a sentence like (7), then, is
not merely a matter of committing oneself to the world being a certain way.
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It is also, at least in part, a matter of committing oneself to using the word
‘planet’ in a certain way.
To be clear, we are not saying that an assertion of (7) is equivalent to an
assertion of (31):
(31) According to how I define ‘planet’, Pluto is a planet.
When a speaker says (7), they do not assert that they use ‘planet’ in a certain
fashion. It is not part of the content of what is asserted that the speaker
adopts a certain convention. Rather, in asserting (7), the speaker merely
expresses their conventional commitments. The difference between (7) and
(31) is similar to the difference between (32-a) and (32-b):
(32) a. It is raining.
b. I think it is raining.
While (32-a) expresses one’s belief that it is raining, only (32-b) asserts that
one believes it is raining. So too, while (7) expresses the conventions one
adopts, only (31) asserts that one adopts these conventions.24
Both in Barker’s framework for modeling gradable adjectives and our
framework for modeling predication more generally, what distinguishes
descriptive uses from classificatory uses is the common ground, not the
content of the assertions. The truth conditions of descriptive and classifi-
catory uses do not differ. Instead, a descriptive use arises when speakers
accept a common plan for how to interpret the sentence asserted, whereas
a classificatory use arises when speakers do not.
To illustrate, suppose speakers in a conversation are completely coor-
dinated over what conventions to adopt—that is, they all agree on how to
use words. In that case, every world-hyperconvention pair in the common
ground will have the same hyperconvention component, i.e., if 〈w1 , c1〉 and
〈w2 , c2〉 are in the common ground, then c1  c2. Thus, an assertion of (7)
in such a context will effectively constitute a proposal to remove possible
worlds from the common ground. Hence, the old Stalnakerian picture of
assertion can be viewed as a special case of the current proposal where
speakers are coordinated on a shared convention.
On the flip side, suppose speakers in a conversation are completely
coordinated regarding what the world is like. In that case, every world-
hyperconvention pair in the common ground will have the same world
component, i.e., if 〈w1 , c1〉 and 〈w2 , c2〉 are in the common ground, then
24On the distinction between asserting and expressing, see, e.g., Gibbard 2003, Yalcin
2012.
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w1  w2. Thus, an assertion of (7) in such a contextwill effectively constitute
a proposal to remove hyperconventions from the common ground. This, in
effect, is what is going on in examples like (25): though Alpha and Beta are
in complete agreement about the facts concerning Pluto, they disagree over
how to classify it.
These are both extreme cases. Usually, conversational participants will
not be completely coordinated either on what the world is like or on how to
use words. In general, a use of (7) can be mixed, being neither completely
descriptive nor completely classificatory. This is a feature of our view, not
a bug. When one learns that some sentence S is true, one often learns
something both about the world and about conventions. When you teach
a child how to use the word ‘plant’ by, for instance, pointing to a rose and
saying ‘This is a plant’, you teach them not only something about how
to use the word ‘plant’ but also something about roses. For clarity, we
will use “descriptive” to refer to purely descriptive uses of sentences, and
“classificatory” for uses that are at least partially classificatory.
4 Semantics for C-Monsters
In §2, we saw that counterfactuals such as (4) can violate Conventional
Wisdom.
(4) If Pluto were a planet, there would be dozens of planets in the solar
system.
That is, counterfactuals can be c-monsters, in the sense that they trigger a
shift in the conventional interpretation of their constituents. In this section,
we build on the theory of assertion from§3 todevelop a semantic framework
for counterfactual c-monsters. We leave for future work the semantics of
other c-monstrous vocabulary.
4.1 The Conventionalist Semantics
Ourproposal, which is largely inspired by thework of Einheuser (2006), is to
take an index of evaluation to be apair of aworld and ahyperconvention and
to allow expressions such as counterfactuals to shift the hyperconvention of
24
an index.25, 26
To demonstrate, we present a simple variant of the Lewis-Stalnaker
semantics for counterfactuals (Stalnaker, 1968; Lewis, 1973) that takes into
account their c-monstrous behavior. We are not ultimately committed to
using this particular semantic framework for modeling counterfactuals;
others could be adapted in a similar way.
Westart by introducinga simple formal languagewithnames (a1 , a2 , a3 , . . .),




3 , . . .), boolean connectives (¬, ∧, ∨, ⊃),
and a counterfactual conditional (). The well-formed formulas of our
language can be summarized in Backus-Naur form as follows:
A F P(a1 , . . . , an) | ¬A | (A ∧ A) | (A ∨ A) | (A ⊃ A) | (A A).
Amodel for this language is a tuple of the formM  〈W,D , f 〉. Here,W is
a nonempty set of worlds and D is a nonempty set of objects (we assume a
constant domain semantics for technical simplicity). To define the selection
function f , we first need some further definitions. A hyperconvention over
M is a function c that maps each name to an element of D and each n-ary
predicate to an n-ary intension overW :
(i) c(a) ∈ D for each name a
(ii) c(Pn) : W → ℘ (Dn) for each n-ary predicate Pn .
An index over M is a world-hyperconvention pair i  〈wi , ci〉. Where IM
is the set of all indices overM, the selection function is a map f : (℘ (IM) ×
IM) → ℘ (IM). The selection function of course needs to satisfy the usual
constraints to be realistic (which may be dropped or modified as desired):
25Other recent work in a similar spirit include Armstrong 2013, Ch. 3 (on loose talk and
imprecision), Muñoz 2019b, Ch. 5 (focusing more on attitude reports), and Gaus 2020 (on
counterfactuals).
26An alternative approach, advocated by Coppock (2018), does not add something like our
hyperconventions to points of evaluation, but instead replacesworlds in points of evaluation
with “outlooks”, or refinements on worlds that settle both factual matters and matters
of opinion. Outlooks do similar work for Coppock as world-hyperconvention pairs do
for us (though she does not discuss counterfactuals). However, where Coppock uses the
machinery of worlds and outlooks to define “discretionary” and “objective” predicates, we
take all predicates discussed above to have precisely the same status. Whether a predicate
is used in a discretionary (classificatory) way simply depends on what convention choices
are common ground among speakers in a conversation. (Note, however, that we do not take
a stand on how to deal with more traditionally “subjective” predicates, like predicates of
personal taste, which is Coppock’s main motivation.) For related discussion, see Muñoz
2019a, p. 24. Separating out conventions in the index will also allow us to clearly define
different understandings of the counterfactual conditional below.
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(i) f (X, i) ⊆ X
(ii) If i ∈ X, then f (X, i)  {i}
(iii) If X ⊆ Y and f (X, i) , ∅, then f (Y, i) , ∅
(iv) If X ⊆ Y and f (Y, i) ∩ X , ∅, then f (X, i)  f (Y, i) ∩ X.
For each sentence A, the semantic value of A in M, i.e., ~AM , is defined
recursively as follows:
~Pn(a1 , . . . , an)M  {i ∈ IM | 〈ci(a1), . . . , ci(an)〉 ∈ ci(Pn)(wi)}
~¬AM  IM − ~AM
~A ∧ BM  ~AM ∩ ~BM , etc.
~A BM  {i ∈ IM | f (~AM , i) ⊆ ~BM}.
Consequence is then defined as preservation of truth over all indices:
A1 , . . . ,An | C iff for every modelM and every index i ∈ IM , if i ∈ ~AkM
for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n, then i ∈ ~CM . Call this the conventionalist semantics.
It can be shown that the logic of the conventionalist semantics is the
logic of the standard Lewis-Stalnaker semantics.27 Thus, the differences
between the two semantics arise not in their consequence relations but
in their assignment of truth conditions. In the standard Lewis-Stalnaker
semantics, the model provides a fixed hyperconvention (i.e., interpretation
function) that is never alteredwhen evaluating the truth of a counterfactual.
On the conventionalist semantics, by contrast, models do not provide a
fixed hyperconvention for evaluating truth. Instead, the hyperconvention
27Proof: it suffices to show that (i) for any pointed conventionalist model, there is a
pointed Lewis-Stalnaker model satisfying the same exact formulas, and (ii) for any pointed
Lewis-Stalnaker model, there is a pointed conventionalist model satisfying the same exact
formulas. A Lewis-Stalnaker model is just a quadruple of the form S  〈W,D , f ,V〉, where
W and D are as before, f : ℘ (W) × W → ℘ (W) satisfies the usual constraints on selection
functions, and I is an interpretation function such that V(a) ∈ D and V(Pn) : W → ℘ (Dn).
For (i): let M  〈W,D , f 〉 be a conventionalist model. Define MS 
〈
IM ,DIM , f ,V
〉
where IM is the set of indices over M and V is the interpretation function such that V(a)
is the function that maps any index 〈w , c〉 to c(a) and V(Pn) is the function that maps any
index 〈w , c〉 to c(Pn)(w). Then by induction, ~AM  ~AMS , i.e., i ∈ ~AM iff i ∈ ~AMS .
For (ii): let S  〈W,D , f ,V〉 be a Lewis-Stalnaker model. Where X is a set of indices
over some model, define X ↾W  {w | ∃c : 〈w , c〉 ∈ X}. Define SC  〈W,D , fC〉 where
fC(X, 〈w , c〉)  {〈v , c〉 ∈ X | v ∈ f (X ↾W , w)} (in otherwords, fC never shifts the convention
component). It is straightforward to check that fC is a selection function. Then by induction,
w ∈ ~AS iff 〈w ,V〉 ∈ ~ASC .
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appears as a shiftable component of the index. It is in this sense that
counterfactuals can shift the conventions used to interpret their constituents
and thus can be c-monsters.28, 29
4.2 Similarity
Just aswith the ordinary Lewis-Stalnaker semantics, wemay think of f (X, i)
as the set of indices in X that are most similar to i in the relevant respects.
What “similar in the relevant respects” amounts to will depend on the
context. Similarity between indices is partly a matter of similarity in factual
component and partly a matter of similarity in conventional component.
Different contexts will assign different weights to similarity with respect to
these components. It is difficult to say anything more specific about how
to determine when one index is more similar than another, but this isn’t a
special problem for the conventionalist semantics.
Einheuser (2006) articulates three different ways to interpret counterfac-
tual conditionals in light of the possibility of shifting conventions:
Countersubstratum. As C is true at 〈w , c〉 iff C is true at every 〈w′, c〉
where w′ differs minimally from w so as to make A true.
Counterconventional. Ac C is true at 〈w , c〉 iff C is true at every 〈w , c′〉
where c′ differs minimally from c so as to make A true.
28A similar approach (inspired by Stalnaker 1978) is to evaluate truth relative to a pair
of worlds, one considered as actual, the other considered as counterfactual, and to let the
world-considered-as-actual determine the convention parameter. This view disallows cases
where the convention parameter comes apart from the world-considered-as-actual, as in (i).
(i) If Pluto were a planet, there would be many more planets than the IAU actually
recognizes.
For this reason we prefer to isolate the convention parameter.
29Note that we have not claimed that the “meaning” of an expression is shifted by the
counterfactual conditional. There are two things one can mean by “meaning” in our frame-
work: the intension (i.e., a function fromworlds to extensions) and the compositional semantic
value of an expression (i.e., a function from hyperconventions to intensions). Counterfactu-
als can shift the former, but not the latter. Similarly, though Alpha and Beta do not express
the same coarse-grained proposition (the same set of worlds) if they say ‘Pluto is a planet’,
they do express the same fine-grained proposition (the same set of world-hyperconvention
pairs). So in that sense, Conventional Wisdom and No C-Monsters hold. But in that same
sense, these principles are trivial: one can always reinvent one’s notion of meaning to
be fine-grained enough for these principles to hold. In its original sense, though, where
the “conventional interpretation” of an expression is understood to be its intension, these
principles fail according to the conventionalist semantics.
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Diagonal Counterfactual. Ad C is true at 〈w , c〉 iff C is true at every
〈w′, c′〉where c′ is the convention grounded in the linguistic practices
of speakers at w′ and w′ differs minimally from w so as to make A
true at 〈w′, c′〉.30
One benefit of our view is that all three of these readings can be predicted
by a single context-sensitive semantic entry for. What determines how
a counterfactual is interpreted are the features of the context that determine
more broadly the notion of similarity used to fix the selection function. In
general, maximizing similarity requires holding fixed as much about our
current situation that is not relevant to the topic under discussion as pos-
sible. In contexts where the conventions being adopted are not at issue,
speakers will tend to hold their conventions fixed when entertaining coun-
terfactual suppositions. In contexts where the conventions are at issue,
speakers will tend instead to hold matters of fact fixed. Thus, what distin-
guishes the different uses of conditionals such as (4) are exactly the features
of context that determine the selection function f more broadly.31
With that said, there may be constraints on how freely context can
influence the selection function. In particular, it is hard to come up with a
natural case where a counterfactual is read purely counterconventionally,
i.e., where the antecedent only shifts the conventional component of an
index. It seems as though shifts in convention are very often, if not always,
associated with shifts in world. Consider a variant on (4):
(33) If Pluto were a planet, there would be dozens of planets in the solar
system, but we wouldn’t call all of them ‘planets’.
Some speakers have the intuition that (33) is false, even bearing in mind
30Einheuser (2006, pp. 467–468) assumes (in our terminology) that each world grounds
exactly one convention. This assumption was introduced for technical simplicity, but it
is arguably not very realistic, and dropping it raises complications for the statement of
Diagonal Counterfactual. We set aside this concern here, though it does raise interesting
questions about what exactly a “diagonal” counterfactual reading is, when this simplifying
assumption is not taken for granted. We thank James Walsh for pointing this out.
31One might think that all counterconventionals in natural language are diagonal coun-
terfactuals in the sense just defined. Here is a potential counterexample to that thought:
(i) If Pluto were a planet, then there would be dozens of planets in the solar system
even if everyone were dead.
This would be true on neither a countersubstratum reading nor a diagonal reading. This
is yet another reason why we do not adopt a Stalnakerian diagonalization approach to
analyzing counterconventionals (cf. footnote 28).
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the true reading of (4). If that’s right, it suggests that something like the
following principle governs selection functions:
No Pure Counterconventionals. If 〈w , c′〉 ∈ f (X, 〈w , c〉), then c′  c.
According to No Pure Counterconventionals, counterfactuals never shift
the conventional component of an index without also shifting the factual
component.
Officially, we remain neutral about No Pure Counterconventionals. Per-
haps there are no pure counterconventional readings in the wild. Or per-
haps they are simply rare. Our semantic framework is flexible enough to
model counterfactual c-monsters whether or not this principle holds. For
ease of exposition, we will continue to use the term “counterconventional”
to include any counterfactual that involves a shift in convention (including
“impure” counterconventionals that shift both) so as not to prejudge the
question over whether No Pure Counterconventionals holds.
In this framework, ConventionalWisdomcorresponds to amuch stronger
principle governing the influence of context on the selection function:
No Counterconventionals. f (X, 〈w , c〉) ⊆ (W × {c}).
According to No Counterconventionals, the only counterfactuals in natural
language are countersubstratums: counterfactuals never shift the conven-
tion parameter of an index. Perhaps in some contexts, No Counterconven-
tionals holds. But as we have argued, it is implausible to maintain that No
Counterconventionals universally governs all conversational contexts.
4.3 Use & Mention
So far, we have only discussed counterfactuals where language is not men-
tioned anywhere in the antecedent or consequent. Even when language is
mentioned, though, much of the story remains the same. For instance, in a
context where speakers are debating how to define ‘planet’, both of the fol-
lowing counterfactuals can shift the conventions used to interpret ‘planet’
in the consequent:
(4) If Pluto were a planet, there would be dozens of planets in the solar
system.
(34) If ‘planet’ were defined so as to include Pluto, there would be dozens
of planets in the solar system.
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Thus, to return to the caseswebeganwith in §1, sentences such as (1) and
(35) can be heard either as countersubstratums or as counterconventionals,
depending on the context:
(1) If ‘water’ referred to gasoline, water would fuel fire.
(35) If you called a dog’s tail a leg, dogs would have five legs.
On its counterconventional reading, (1) can be heard as true (without chang-
ing the chemical nature of water); and likewise for (35) (without changing
the anatomy of dogs). This is to reject the received wisdom about such sen-
tences, which holds that they have only one reading, namely, the counter-
substratum one; and on this reading both are false. When people interpret
these sentences as true, the conventional wisdom goes, they are engaging
in a sort of use-mention confusion. By contrast, our view rationalizes these
“confused” uses as legitimate interpretations of these counterfactuals that
naturally fall out of a systematic theory of c-monsters. (The riddle is a riddle
at all because there are two ways to interpret the question.)
Still, there is a difference between counterfactuals where language is ex-
plicitly mentioned and counterfactuals where it is not. In particular, while
(4) and (34)may coincide on their counterconventional reading, theydiverge
on their countersubstratum reading. On its countersubstratum reading, (4)
involves evaluating counterfactual scenarios where Pluto’s orbit is different.
On the countersubstratum reading of (34), however, we evaluate scenarios
where the word ‘planet’ is used differently. Thus, the countersubstratum
readings of (4) and (34) express different (though in both cases false) propo-
sitions.
5 Doing without Conventional Wisdom
In this section, we reassess the two influential philosophical arguments
from §1 that relied on the now-rejected Conventional Wisdom. We show
that Kripke’s defense of the necessity of identity survives largely intact, but
Lewy’s objection to modal conventionalism does not.
5.1 The Necessity of Identity
Recall Kripke’s defense of the necessity of identity. Consider a counterfac-
tual world w where Venus is the morning star while Mars is the evening
star. Why is w not a world where Hesperus and Phosphorus are distinct?
The reason, according to Kripke, is that what is true at w depends on our
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linguistic conventions, not those of speakers in w. Speakers in w use the
names ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ to refer to different individuals, so the
sentence ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ will be false in their language. But if we
describe w in our language, where ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ both refer
to Venus, then it is still true at w that Hesperus is Phosphorus. And by
Conventional Wisdom, only this latter point is relevant to the modal status
of identity. Hence, this is not a counterexample to the necessity of identity.
Atfirst, the failureofConventionalWisdomseems toundermineKripke’s
argument. Counterfactuals can be c-monsters, and, as we saw in §2, it is
plausible that many metaphysically loaded expressions, such as those ex-
pressing metaphysical necessity, can be as well. So we would expect the
following sentences to have c-monstrous readings:32
(36) a. HadMars shone but a bit brighter, Hesperuswould not be Phos-
phorus.
b. Hesperus and Phosphorus could have been distinct.
Kripke’s argument seems to require that there is only one (false) interpre-
tation of such sentences. When people say things like (36-b) in ordinary
conversation, he claims, they are really just speaking loosely or making a
mistake (or are using ‘could’ in an epistemic sense). Their use should be
explained by pragmatics or some kind of error theory, not by a semantic
theory that allows for such sentences to be literally true.
On this point, of course, we part ways with Kripke. These uses are
not just mistakes or loose talk. Rather, they are predicted by a systematic,
well-behaved, and independentlymotivated semantic theory of c-monsters.
Indeed, the availability of a c-monstrous interpretation of (36-b) might ex-
plain why there was so much initial confusion over contingent identity:
people conflated the reading of (36-b) on which the meanings of ‘Hesperus’
and ‘Phosphorus’ can be shifted with the reading on which their meanings
are held fixed.
Despite this, however, we think that the spirit of Kripke’s argument
32Notice that the c-monstrous reading of (36-a) shifts the convention governing ‘Hesperus’
and ‘Phosphorus’ even though those terms do not occur in the antecedent. Though the
examples discussed in §2 did not have this feature, we think such counterfactuals can
naturally be interpreted counterconventionally, and our semantics in §4 allows this. As
another example, the following seems true on its counterconventional reading, but false on
its countersubstratum reading:
(i) If the IAU had decided differently, Pluto would be a planet.
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survives. As Kripke (1980, p. 77) already pointed out, the sense in which
(36-b) is true gives rise only to a relatively cheap form of contingent identity.
In that sense, 2+2 and 4 couldhavebeendistinct. Indeed, practically nothing
is necessary in this sense, since we can always reinterpret the meanings of
our terms however we like.
The philosophically interesting question, and the one Kripke clearly had
in mind, is over the descriptive reading of (36-b), where we hold fixed the
actualmeanings of ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ and askwhether the objects
those names actually denote could have been distinct. This question is not
trivial, as some have argued that identity is contingent even in this sense.33
Thus, even though Kripke appeals to Conventional Wisdom in defending
the necessity of identity, he need not have. He does not have to deny that
(36-b) has a true c-monstrous reading. He only has to say that (36-b) is false
on its descriptive reading.
One might question, furthermore, whether the sentences in (36) even
admit of c-monstrous readings. While predicates can undeniably be reinter-
preted in the scope of counterfactuals, attitude verbs, and the like, it is less
clear that names can undergo the same reinterpretation. For instance, the
oddness of the sentences in (37) suggests that the names in (36) do not pass
the usual tests for classificatory uses (§3.1):
(37) a. ?I count Hesperus as Phosphorus.
b. ?I consider Hesperus [to be] Phosphorus.
c. ?To me, Hesperus is Phosphorus.
Even though a linguistic community may attach names to objects however
it pleases, it seems to be odd, once names are attached to objects, to take
there still to be a choice about which things are identical. Thus, though
Conventional Wisdom is not generally true, there is some reason to suspect
that it might be a true principle governing names, in which case Kripke’s
appeal to it would be perfectly legitimate. Kripke’s defense of the necessity
of identity along these lines would not, then, be undermined by the failure
of Conventional Wisdom. One could not simply appeal to c-monsters to
argue for the contingency of identity.34
However, the judgments in (37) seem to be affected by the fact that
the usage of ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ is fully settled in our linguistic
community. In a context where the designations of ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phos-
33See Lewis 1971, 1986; Gibbard 1975; Karmo 1983; Schwarz 2014; Kocurek 2018.
34Ofcourse, thiswouldbeapurelydefensivemaneuveronKripke’spart. Other arguments
against the necessity of identity exist; see Schwarz 2013 for discussion.
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phorus’ are not settled, the judgments in (37) improve. Thus, it is likely
that the defectiveness of the sentences in (37) only arises because of the lack
of classificatory contingency (in the sense of Kennedy and Willer 2016, as
discussed above) of the names in question. And itmay generally be rarer for
the meaning of names to be under dispute, compared with the meaning of
predicates.35 Still, we think it best not to appeal to any distinctive linguistic
behavior of names as compared with predicates in rehabilitating Kripke’s
argument against the necessity of identity.
5.2 Modal Conventionalism
Lewy’s objection to modal conventionalism, recall, is that it seems to falsely
predict that whether 68 + 57  125 depends on our linguistic conventions.
One way to put the objection is in terms of counterfactuals. Modal conven-
tionalism wrongly predicts that (38) is true:
(38) If ‘+’ had meant quus, 68 + 57would be 5.
Another way to get at the objection is in terms of the necessity of necessity:
modal conventionalism seems to entail that what is necessary or contingent
is itself a contingent matter. This violates a plausible principle of modal
reasoning, viz., the 4 axiom, which states that if A is necessary, then A is
necessarily necessary (◻A ⊃ ◻◻A).
But is modal conventionalism really committed to (38)? As Einheuser
(2006) points out, it depends on whether it is interpreted as a countersub-
stratum or as a counterconventional.36 Interpreted as a countersubstratum,
(38) is false. Holding fixed what we mean by ‘+’, 68 + 57 could not be 5.
Interpreted as a counterconventional, (38) is true. But, as with contingent
identity, it is true in an unproblematic and uncontroversial way. It just says
that, had we adopted different conventions, different claims would count
as necessary under those conventions. This is something that everybody
should accept and does not present a particularly damning problem for the
conventionalist.
Einheuser recommends exactly this line on behalf of the conventionalist.
35The interesting general question of what types of expressions do and do not allow for
convention-shifting is one we have only begun to answer here. An anonymous reviewer
notes that it seems harder to get a convention-shifting reading of indexicals and demonstra-
tives than it is for names and predicates. More generally, we suspect it is harder to shift
functional or closed class terms than lexical or open class terms. But for now, we leave this
as a conjecture. On the shiftability of logical vocabulary, see Kocurek and Jerzak 2020.
36Wright (1985) makes a similar point on behalf of the conventionalist.
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Though her main objective was to defend ontological conventionalism,
according to which what exists depends onwhat conventions we adopt, her
defense applies equally to modal conventionalism. Here is how she puts
the defense:
Conventionalists about abstract objects do not claim that since
[the sentence◻(there are numbers)] dependson contingent con-
ventions, [the sentence◇¬◻(there are numbers)] is true. Rather,
they claim that, against the conceptual background of our actual
practices, the existence of numbers is necessary. Had these
practices been suitably different, they would have generated a
different set of metaphysically possible worlds relative to which
the existence of numbers would not be necessary. . . (p. 477)
Thus, according to Einheuser, Lewy’s objection gets off the ground only
by uncharitably interpreting (38) as a countersubstratum instead of as a
counterconventional.
However, there is still something unsatisfying about this way of re-
sponding to Lewy’s objection. After all, on the counterconventional inter-
pretation, (38) says something that nobody should deny: that if we had
spoken differently, different claims would count as necessary on that way
of speaking. The same holds for any truth whatsoever. Whether ‘Grass
is green’ counts as true also depends on our linguistic conventions in this
sense. How does this mundane observation reveal anything deep or inter-
esting about the nature of necessity? And how does it provide us with the
empiricist-friendly modal epistemology that modal conventionalists seek?
The conventionalist has to providemore than themere existence of coun-
terconventional readings of (38) in order to make good on the promises of
a deflationary, empiricist-friendly epistemology of modality. Towards this
end, we propose to supplement (or perhaps, replace) conventionalism with
the following claim: the sole function of modal claims is to express aspects
of our conventional commitments. We call this viewmodal expressivism.
When we look back at Ayer’s statement of modal conventionalism, we
find that his view is actually closer to modal expressivism than critics have
recognized. In the preface of Language, Truth and Logic, he outlines his view
in this way:
Like Hume, I divide all genuine propositions into two classes:
those which, in his terminology, concern “relations of ideas,”
and those which concern “matters of fact.” The former class
comprises the a priori propositions of logic and pure mathemat-
ics, and these I allow to be necessary and certain only because
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they are analytic. That is, I maintain that the reason why these
propositions cannot be confuted in experience is that they do
not make any assertion about the empirical world, but simply
record our determination to use symbols in a certain fashion.
(p. 31, emphasis added)
The vocabulary Ayer uses when describing his view is telling. He says
necessary truths ‘record’, ‘illustrate’, ‘call attention to’, or ‘reveal’ the way
we use language. He does not say they assert anything about language.
In fact, he states explicitly that “they do not make any assertion about the
empirical world”, and so a fortiori do not make any claim about linguistic
conventions (or how they’re connected to necessity). This suggests that
Ayer’s view comes closer to what we are calling modal expressivism than
is generally recognized.
Modal expressivism can accomplish much of what modal convention-
alists want their view to do. For instance, it provides us with an empiricist-
friendly modal epistemology, on which we can come to know what is nec-
essary or contingent by reflecting on the way we use language—that is,
reflecting on what linguistic conventions we adopt. We know that neces-
sarily, all bachelors are unmarried because we know we adopt conventions
according to which the sentence ‘All bachelors are unmarried’ is true re-
gardless of what the world is like.
It also avoids a classic worry for modal conventionalism stemming from
Kripke’s observation that some necessary truths, such as ‘Water is H2O’
are only knowable a posteriori. If necessary truths are necessary solely in
virtue of our linguistic conventions, then shouldn’t all necessary truths be
knowable a priori? WhileAyer did indeed conflate necessitywith the a priori,
and so does seem committed to this claim, modal expressivism need not
accept this inference. From the fact that modal claims are mere expressions
of our linguistic conventions, it does not follow that we must have infallible
epistemic access to every feature of the linguistic conventions we endorse.
To see why, recall an observation we made in §3.2: conventional com-
mitments of a speaker may be conditional on other facts obtaining. For
example, someone could adopt the following plan for how to use ‘planet’:
use the word ‘planet’ in whatever way the IAU uses it. To determine which
conventions such a speaker is committed to, they then need to find out how
the IAU uses the term. Thus, modal expressivism allows for the existence
of necessary a posteriori truths while explaining how in general we have
epistemic access to the modal truths.
The view we are calling modal expressivism has precursors in the lit-
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erature. It is closely connected to the modal normativism defended by
Thomasson (2013).37 On this view, modal claims “provide a particularly
useful way of expressing constitutive semantic and conceptual rules in the
object language” (p. 145). Thus, when one asserts ‘Necessarily, all bachelors
are men’, one is expressing a semantic rule to the effect that ‘bachelor’ only
correctly applies to objects to which ‘man’ correctly applies. Though they
have their differences, modal expressivism and Thomasson’smodal norma-
tivism are allies in the debate over the nature of modality.38 Both maintain
that modal statements are simply expressions of linguistic conventions in
some form or other.
37See also Thomasson 2017, 2018. For a defense of a similar view, see Sidelle 1989. It is
also in the spirit of ontological expressivism as defended by Flocke (2019), as well as the
more global form of expressivism defended by Price (2013).
38There are twomaindifferences between theviews. First, Thomassondenies the existence
of counterconventional readings of sentences such as (38) (pp. 153–154). Thus, on her
view, conveying semantic norms is particular to modal expressions, whereas on modal
expressivism, it is not—what distinguishes modal expressions from others is that this is
their sole function. Second, the two views differ over compositional semantics. According
to Thomasson, the meaning of ‘necessarily’ is constituted by two rules:
Necessity Intro. If p is an object-language expression of a constitutive semantic rule, then
you are entitled to conclude: ‘necessarily p’, regardless of any subjunctive supposi-
tions.
Necessity Elim. If you have ‘necessarily p’ as a premise, you may use p as a premise in
your reasoning anywhere, under any subjunctive suppositions.
However, while these rules dictate how to reason about necessity, they do not fix the com-
positional semantic value of ‘necessarily’. This matters when we consider embeddings such
as:
(i) Alpha does not believe that it is necessary that all planets clear their orbital neigh-
borhood.
(ii) Something is necessarily human.
By contrast, our proposal offers a clear answer to the compositional semantic value question.
Here is the semantic value of the necessity operator ‘◻’:
~◻AM  {〈w , c〉 ∈ IM | ∀v ∈ WM : 〈v , c〉 ∈ ~AM}
That is,◻A is true at i just in case A is true no matter how we change the world parameter
of i. Using the standard semantics for ‘Alpha believes that’, we can state the truth conditions
for (i) as follows: (i) is true iff there is a world-hyperconvention pair 〈w , c〉 compatible
with Alpha’s doxastic state (including their conventional commitments) such that for some
world v, the sentence ‘all planets clear their orbital neighborhood’ is false at v as interpreted
by c. A similar story could be told about quantifiers if we enrich indices with a variable
assignment in the standard way.
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Unlike Kripke’s argument in defense of the necessity of identity, then,
Lewy’s argument againstmodal conventionalism seems to lose its force once
Conventional Wisdom is dropped. Modal conventionalists can vindicate
their ideas by rebranding themselves as modal expressivists. In doing
so, they need not accept any bizarre consequences to the effect that we
as language-users have supernatural control over mathematics, or that all
necessary truths must be scrutable to us. The fact that modal claims are
merely expressions of our conventional commitments does not entail that
we are omniscient about those conventional commitments.
6 Conclusion
According to the conventional wisdom, there is an important distinction
between the language we use to describe a scenario and the language that
is used in that scenario. When we describe a scenario, we must use our lan-
guage rather than the language that speakers in that scenariowould use. As
Kripke puts it, even when we describe a scenario where we are all speaking
German, we describe it in English. Thus, the linguistic conventions used to
calculate the compositional semantic value of an expression always remain
anchored to actuality. Embedding expressions never induce a revision to
those conventions. Language is safe from c-monsters.
On the contrary: the seas of language are crawling with c-monsters.
Counterfactuals, along with many other expressions, shift the conventions
used to evaluate their constituents in a wide variety of ordinary conversa-
tional contexts, including metalinguistic negotiations. These cases expose
the flaw in the conventional wisdom. Fortunately, we can generalize stan-
dard semantic and pragmatic frameworks in a way that holds onto their
advantages, while removing their commitment to Conventional Wisdom.
On the pragmatic side, we generalize Stalnaker’s framework to allow for
communication not only about worldly facts, but also about how to use
words—a move that mirrors how classificatory uses of gradable adjectives
have beenmodeled. On the semantic side, we introduce (hyper)conventions
as a shiftable parameter of the index of evaluation, thus accounting for c-
monsters within a modified Lewis-Stalnaker semantics for counterfactual
conditionals. Our best semantic and pragmatic theoretical tools, it turns
out, do not crucially rely on holding fixed our actual conventions. There
may be c-monsters, but they can be tamed.
The existence of c-monsters in natural language points to a more nu-
anced picture of linguistic competence than is standardly employed. On the
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standard view, understanding a language consists in simply understanding
the rules governing how to use particular expressions. It is often assumed
that a language can be identified with a collection of such rules, which are
settled in advance by the linguistic community. It is as if, once we settle the
conventional interpretation of a word, it becomes impossible for speakers
to use that word in away that is incompatible with that interpretationwhile
still speaking the same language. Purported examples of c-monsters, on
this view, are just cases where speakers are speaking a different language.
From our perspective, this relies on an overly rigid conception of what a
language is. One could, of course, use the term “language” so narrowly that
any two speakers who did not associate every word in the lexicon with the
same exact meanings would count as speaking “different languages”. But
this would be a highly specialized notion, of limited interest to the study
of natural language.39 No one actually has this conception of a language in
mind when talking about natural languages such as English. The bound-
aries of natural languages are vague. The rules and conventions governing
how to use words are neither fully determinate nor static. On this more
realistic conception of a language, speakers need only agree on how to talk
to a sufficient extent to count as speaking the same language. Whether two
people are speaking the same language is best viewed as amatter of degree.
Given the vague and ever-changing boundaries of language, speakers
need to be flexible enough to know how to use language according to
alternative conventions. A true chess master knows how to play chess well
not only in normal circumstances but also under a variety of abnormal
circumstances, e.g., when they are handicapped a piece, or when the pieces
on the back rank are shuffled randomly. Thus, it is not surprising that
natural languages like English include mechanisms for interpreting words
under alternative conventions. C-monsters are manifestations of a broad
linguistic competence—not only to use a finite stock of words with fixed
meanings, but to communicate and negotiate with a flexible and evolving
language.
39Compare Davidson 1986, p. 174: “There is no such a thing as a language, not if a
language is anything like what many philosophers and linguists have supposed. [. . . ] We
must give up the idea of a clearly defined shared structure which language users acquire
and then apply to cases. And we should try again to say how convention in any important
sense is involved in language; or, as I think, we should give up the attempt to illuminate
how we communicate by appeal to conventions.” As should be clear, we agree with the
negative point about language as philosophers and linguists have traditionally conceived of
it. However, our conventionalist semantics offers a way to reject the overly rigid traditional
view while still giving conventions a prominent and systematic—if unconventional—place
in our theory of meaning and communication. (See Armstrong 2016 for related discussion.)
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